Tuesday 9 August 2011

The Malaysian Solution - how it happened and why it matters

This was supposed to be the Eureka moment for the
Government. After a year of policy contortion - including
ill-fated flirtation with East Timor and Papua New Guinea -
finally an entente, a deal, a solution.

Whatever your perspective on the refugee situation, it can
hardly be denied that a ‘solution’ is needed. Because in
politics, the perception is the reality. And as John Howard
recently observed in a rare interview, Australians perceive
that their borders are under siege.

To that end, the Government has signed an agreement to
send up to 800 asylum seekers to Malaysia, where they
will remain until their refugee status is determined and
subsequent resettlement arranged. As Julia Gillard has
stressed, their claims will not be prioritised – they will be
at the back of the “queue”.

Malaysia is strategically significant because the majority
of boat arrivals pass through there before continuing to
Australia. Almost 100,000 linger under the table awaiting
resettlement, unable to work legally and living in squalor.

The reasons to seek another way out are manifold. Fear
of being arrested and detained, and possibly subjected to
abuse including caning, motivates some. Others simply tire
of the arduous, interminable wait, which can be decades.

It should be noted that the asylum seekers Australia
sends to Malaysia will have it better than the rest, at
least according to the plan. They will be allowed to work,
will have basic living expenses paid for by the Australian
government, and will not be caned as per Malaysian law.
Whether that eventuates is anyone’s guess.

The intent of the policy is to dissuade, not punish.
Logic dictates that nobody will board a boat bound for
Australia when they will only end up back in Malaysia. The
Government hopes that it will not end up responsible for
the welfare of 800 asylum seekers on the streets of Kuala
Lumpur, but that the trickle will dry up immediately.

The disincentive is borrowed from the Pacific Solution
– deny the prospect of entry in to Australia, and the
boats will stop. But already there are factors poised to
derail that outcome.

The Government is tentatively committed to not sending
unaccompanied minors to Malaysia, although that resolve
is now being tested. Aboard the first boat to arrive under
the terms of this agreement were, at the time of writing,
18 people claiming to be under 18 years of age. What’s the
immigration minister, Chris Bowen, to do?

The initial answer appears to be: bluster. The Government
is busy reiterating the importance of not having a blanket
exemption for minors, because people smugglers would
then clog the boats with children. Meanwhile, there will
be continuing “assessment” of the claimants’ age.

The reciprocal part of the deal will see Australia take 4000
refugees currently awaiting resettlement in Malaysia.
This has given rise to the popular characterisation of the
policy as a “people swap”, and Opposition immigration
spokesman Scott Morrison’s claims that we are getting a raw
deal. But it’s also the part of the agreement that has satiated
many on the Left, including within the ALP.

We may never send anywhere near 800 back to Malaysia,
which would be a good thing. If cameras could permeate
the walls of the Phosphate Hill detention centre, they would
capture a new level of desperation. They would help us
understand how it feels to spend $55,000 securing an escape
for your family, only to be told you will be shunted back to
where you came from.

The Malaysia policy matters because it is likely to work. The
news will quickly spread amongst the refugee communities
and people smugglers of the region, as it did last time when
arrivals were taken to Nauru. Already rumours suggest
other countries such as New Zealand are being favoured
as potential destinations for asylum seekers willing to
take the risk.

But it matters more broadly because of how it works and
what that says about us, because the Malaysia Solution
creates sacrificial lambs – these initial boatloads who will be
mercilessly turned away in order to establish a deterrent. It
is to these confused and crying families that Australia points
and says ‘don’t try it’.

If that message is successful, it will have two important
implications for the Australian policy. Firstly, it will entrench
the practice of sending boat arrivals elsewhere as the only
way to deal with the problem. Other countries may be used
instead, if a regional structure ever manifests, but it will be a
long time before an Australian government puts its hand up
to process people onshore.

Secondly, it will reinforce within the Labor Party the theory
that being tough on asylum seekers is their only plausible
political option. The Left faction has largely shut up about
the Malaysia Solution because at least, if it works, it will
take the issue off the six o’clock news and off the talkback
stations – and that is an imperative all of Labor is agreed
upon. When boats are an issue, Labor loses.

The international community will don the same raised
eyebrows it has in the past, wondering what all the fuss
is about. The deal was originally announced in May
but concluded in late July, the delay mostly due to the
Government’s desire to get the UNHCR’s approval.

In a media release, the agency reminded us of its preference
to have all arrivals processed on the Australian mainland. But it also noted that discouraging dangerous sea journeys
was a positive humanitarian outcome. It will monitor
the implementation of the agreement closely, no doubt
confused as to why such a rich, peaceful country would feel
the need to act in this way.

If it all feels like history repeating, that’s not a surprise. The
leaky boat is our ultimate political saga, one that refuses
to go away. Even if you think there’s no problem, even if
you don’t care, even if you just don’t want to talk about it
anymore – you will have to.

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Originally published in Honi Soit, 10 August 2011

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